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Vault7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed

Navigation: » Directory » User #20251227 » User #20251227’s Home


Owner: User #20251227

Page of Holding

('toc' missing)

Miscellaneous stuff goes here.

Mount a CIFS/Windows share on Linux w/ "good" user permissions:

(may need to install cifs-utils, will likely need to execute command as root) 

mount -t cifs -o rw,exec,domain=<Windows domain>,user=<Windows user>,uid=<local Linux user>,gid=<local Linux user>,file_mode=0644,dir_mode=0755 //<ip>/<sharename> <mountpath> 

Blog Post Ideas

  • MIME and Python's SImpleHTTPServer
  • Python's SimpleHTTPServer, reverse DNS, and hangs
  • Python's 'is' versus '=='
  • Python decorators
  • vdb/vtrace tutorials
  • vstruct tutorials
  • Reversing/ASM/IDA stuff
    • IDAPython QuickStart
    • Using IDA in batch mode
    • Similarity Analysis w/ BinDIff
  • ???
  • Prepping Windows B0x3n
    • ixnay ASLR
    • adjust NX settings
  • VIM - window open, division, controls (e.g., :abo sp <foo.txt>, :rightb vs <bar.txt>, '<number>CTRL-W -', ...
  • Series on writing a (unicode-compatible) keylogger for Windows
    • One really wants "language elements" not button presses
    • Fun with scan codes, manufacturers, laptops, keyboard layouts, ...
    • Dead Keys, Ligatures
    • Unicode, code points, code units, language elements, and the representation/encoding used (utf-16-le)
    • Windows issues
      • (up through Win8)  keyboard state caching, per-thread,  key buffer and the *^&(&*%$#@! flushing behavior.

Setup a Python Virtual Environment

(this specific example assumes Python 3.4 w/ Debian 8 as host box.  The following assumes that we will create a virtual environment WITHOUT actually installing the virtualenv utility)

  1. Procure copy of virtualenv ( Version 13.1.2 ), and un-tgz the tarball somewhere.  Make a note of where the un-tgz'd contents are.
  2. Assume you wish to house the files for a virtualenv in /home/user/pyenvs/testenv
  3. mkdir -p /home/user/pyenvs/testenv
  4. cd to the directory where the un-tgz'd contents are located, there should be a 'virtualenv.py' file in this directory
  5. issue:  'python3 virtualenv.py --always-copy /home/user/pyenvs/testenv'
  6. VOILA!
  7. To activate the new virtual environment, simply:
    1. cd /home/user/pyenvs/testenv
    2. 'source bin/activate'
    3. 'python3'
    4. VOILA!

Git Fun

Useful pages:

  • Git Reference
  • Git Tutorials ("More info on Git Flow - "A successful Git branching model" --Workflow.  Get the multi-page paper, not just the diagram)

Protip:  use the "--no-ff" switch when doing 'git merge'.  The reason for this is so the "branch" history remains as a conceptually separate entity (see the above mentioned 'branching model' document).

Workflow (feature branch based):

  • (assuming starting in master) - create the feature branch:  git branch featurebranch
  • switch to the branch:  git checkout featurebranch
  • do standard workflow (git status, git add, git commit, ...)
  • periodically push the branch to the remote server:  git push origin featurebranch
  • periodically merge changes from mainline into the featurebranch, resolving any issues (note the "--no-ff"!!!, and assuming master is fully up-to-date):  git merge --no-ff master
  • periodically pull from the "central" repo:  git pull --no-ff
  • when ready to merge into mainline (e.g., code reviewed, tests pass, up-to-date w/r/t merges from master, no uncommitted changes):
    • change to master:  git checkout master
    • merge from the feature branch into master:  git merge --no-ff featurebranch
    • tag the current spot:  git tag closed-featurebranch featurebranch
    • push everything:  git push --all
    • push the tag: 'git push origin closed-featurebranch'
    • delete the local branch:  git branch -d featurebranch
    • delete the remote branch:  git push origin --delete featurebranch
  • If, at a later point, the branch needs to be re-opened, do so via the previously created tag:  git branch reopened-featurebranch closed-featurebranch

Merge (assume in branch foo, and want to merge foo into branch bar)

>git branch --list * foo bar >git checkout bar Switched to branch 'bar' >git branch --list foo * bar >git merge --no-ff foo

Symbols & symchk

Normal use:

 

Create manifest file for "offline" use:

 

Use previously created manifest to go grab symbols:

Prepping Windows B0x3n

There are times when one might want to disable features on a box used for development & analysis.  For those times you can:

  • Disable Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLRAddress Space Layout Randomization):
    • add the DWORD HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\MoveImages and give it a value of 0
      • 0 - Disable ASLR
      • 1 - Enable ASLR
      • 0xFFFFFFFF - Force ASLR
  • Disable (Hardware) Data Execution Protection (DEP) / No Execute(NX) (note that the deafult on Win7 is OptIn)
    • From an admin command prompt: 'bcdedit /set nx AlwaysOff' & since, DEP and PAE are tied together, and since disabling DEP will, depending upon the Windows version, also disable PAE, one must make sure PAE is still with us via, "bcdedit /set pae ForceEnable"

Crypto Fun

As of this writing (late 2015), The following seem to be commonly listed as "best practices" for doing crypto things...

  • No SSLSecure Socket Layer version should be used ( SSLv1 has been known to be insecure, SSLv2 had problems, and SSLv3 had public issues like POODLE), use TLSTransport Layer Security instead
  • TLS v1.2 is the most current, and accepted practice is to use this.
  • Disable the ability to downgrade the protocol (e.g., wanted TLSv1.2, but didn't have it available, do the protocol auto-downgrades to SSLv2 for example)
  • Disable TLSTransport Layer Security compression (see public vulns like CRIME, BEAST, ...)
  • (Perfect) Forward Secrecy is a great thing.  Ephemeral Keying/Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman.
  • Use of RC4 is a no-no
  • AES w/ GCM mode is commonly accepted as the go-to right now
  • Certificate Pinning is also a best practice.
  • SHA1 is a no-no
  • HTTP Compression can cause problems (see vulns TIME & BREACH)
  • Beware/Disable Session ID/Session Tickets (i.e., SSL/TLS Session Resumption)  caching of key material can be bad....
  • Disabling session renegotiation is likely a good thing.
  • Diffie-Hellman parameters should be greater than RSAEncryption algorithm key size
    • For ephemeral DHDiffie-Hellman encryption (e.g., Perfect Forward Secrecy), the normal way TLSTransport Layer Security does it is that DHDiffie-Hellman encryption parameters are generated ahead of time and "belong" to the server
    • The above implies that for a "communication pair" (composed of keys and certs for a client<->listener combo), one should probably generate new parameters along with keys & certs?
  • Elliptic Curves are considered preferred, but not necessarily widespread.
  • Finding out about elliptic curve selection (e.g., specifying a curve to use) is a PITA.  ECC has a "bit rating" which is equivalent to some (greater) amount of RSA-bits.
    • NIST has preferred/specified curves (e.g., P-384, P-521) which made it into a FIPS standard (186-3)
    • Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SECG) also has recommended curves (SEC-2 Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters) (e.g., secp256r1, secp521r1)
    • ANSI also has standards (e.g., X9.62, X9.63)
    1. in general, one selects a 'generic' "key strength" in units of bits, then determines an equivalent key strength for elliptic curve, then selects a provided, "standard" curve (e.g., P-384)

So, for teh ultimateZ in fun:

  •  TLS v1.2, AES-256, GCM, SHA2+, ECEdgeCase bits >= 256, DHDiffie-Hellman encryption Params >= 2048
  •  AES-256, EC512, SHA512

Some useful links/references:

  • Standards for Efficient Cryptography (www.secg.org) (Version 2 was current as of this writing)
  •  Applied Crypto Hardening, https://bettercrypto.org
  • Security/Server Side TLS, https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS
  • SSL/TLS Deployment Best Practices, https://www.ssllabs.com
  • NIST Cryptographic Toolkit, csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/toolkit/
  • Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security, rfc4492, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492
  • www.keylength.com (shows comparison for key lengths)
  • ECRYPT II, www.ecrypt.eu.org/ecrypt2 (check out the yearly reports on algorithms and key lengths)

Some Fun OpenSSL CLICommand-Line Interface Work

(the following all assume use of openssl 1.0.1e on Debian 7.8)

List available elliptic curves:


Generate an Elliptic Curve-based private key (assumes use of openssl 1.0.1e on Debian 7):


Generate a public key from a given Elliptic Curve-based private key:


Generate a cert signing request (CSR), given an existing private key:


(self) sign a CSR to make a (root, trusted, CACovert Action) certificate (good for 7 days):


Generate a signed certificate from a CSR, a root/CA certificate, and the root/CA's private key:


View the contents of a certificate:


Use openssl's client to do a connect:

SQLite fun

Get a list of all tables (ref sqlite's FAQ:  "How do I list all tables/indices contained in an SQLite database?)


Get a count of all tables


See if a table has any data:


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