

JFK Assassination System  
Identification Form

Date: 5/5/2016

## Agency Information

AGENCY : NARA  
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10011-10152  
RECORD SERIES : NSF  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

## Document Information

ORIGINATOR : WH  
FROM :  
TO : THE RECORD  
TITLE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD  
DATE : 06/08/1961  
PAGES : 4  
SUBJECTS :  
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES  
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT  
CLASSIFICATION : Secret  
RESTRICTIONS : 1C  
CURRENT STATUS : Redact  
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/08/1998  
OPENING CRITERIA : UPON AGENCY REVIEW  
COMMENTS : NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(CI) MEETINGS:6/61-10/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-92-104

**SECRET - EYES ONLY**

6/24/61  
 Recd from  
 Mr. Bundy  
 ARB

8 June 1961

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD****SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 June 1961****PRESENT: Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Ralph Dungan, Dulles**

Mr. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, participated in the Special Group meeting for the first time.

**1. Congo**

Messrs. Bowles and Gilpatric agreed with the plan for the Congo. Mr. Bowles conditioned his approval on the acceptance of the three provisions set forth in the State Department internal memorandum dated 6 June 1961 (copy attached). Mr. Dulles indicated that these conditions were accepted by the Agency but he pointed out that the condition which proscribed the inclusion of Gizenga or his representative in the Leopoldville Government involved the danger of bringing in a representative of Moscow who would attempt to subvert and control the government. Mr. Bundy felt that he could not approve this program without reference to higher authority.

Note was made of the possibility that if Gizenga decided to participate in a new Leopoldville Government or Parliament, he had ample resources and a chance eventually to win control of the government.

**2. Review of Political Action Projects**

Mr. Bundy stated that because of the special sensitivity of programs involving covert support to political parties and leaders in friendly countries, higher authority wished to review them. Mr. Bundy proposed Thursday or Friday, June 15th or 16th, for this purpose.

Mr. Bowles suggested that we might ask to have a general policy enunciated regarding this subject. Other members of the Group

**SECRET - EYES ONLY**

suggested that a general policy statement might not be sufficiently flexible to take care of special situations which might arise.

Mr. Dulles noted that the pertinent NSC paper authorized programs such as that under discussion, but emphasized that he would only undertake this type of activity if it was fully supported by the Department of State and higher authority. He stated that he fully appreciated the sensitivity of this type of activity. Mr. Dulles said, however, that he felt the Special Group should have some latitude to make decisions on these matters within the general policy which might be laid down by higher authority without referral of each specific case for approval.

Mr. Bundy stated that he would like Mr. Dungan to work with our people in the preparation of the briefing to be given higher authority next week.

3. Release Procedures - Francis Gary Powers

Because of the contingency nature of this proposal and because of the crowded agenda, discussion of this matter was deferred to the next meeting.

4. STPOLLY Flight, Vietnam

This flight was approved with Chinat personnel. There was some discussion as to the desirability of having South Vietnamese conduct these missions but it was pointed out that they did not have the competence.

5. Covert Annex, Vietnam

This annex was approved. It was noted that a progress report had just been received and it was suggested that this report be distributed to members of the Group.

6. Covert Annex, Korea

Mr. Bundy reiterated the decision that covert annexes should not be processed through the NSC machinery. Because of the interest of higher authority in political action operations in friendly areas (see Item 2) and since this annex was written in rather broad terms, he would like to check it further.

**7. TACKLE**

Mr. Dulles stated that while he wanted to open discussion of this matter at this meeting, he did not expect a final decision to be made until the next meeting. Mr. Bundy noted the previous reservations of the State Department and the fact that this matter had been considered but not approved three times previously. Mr. Gilpatrick supported the need for current information which TACKLE would produce and suggested the possible use of U. S. personnel for the TACKLE mission. Mr. Dulles stated his opinion that the use of American personnel would raise serious problems in the event of an accident. The use of well qualified Chinat crews, in his opinion, would mitigate the risks involved. It was agreed that the proposal would be resubmitted later.

**8. Nicaragua**

Mr. Dulles outlined the nature and value of the equipment remaining at Puerto Cabezas and of the need for negotiating with Somoza to effect its recovery. He indicated that some quid pro quo would probably be involved in achieving an agreement with Somoza. Mr. Bundy stated that this was a matter that should be negotiated between the Agency and the Department of State and need not be again referred to the Special Group.

**9. Cuba**

Mr. Dulles stated that he wanted to raise in a general way at this meeting the problem of the Agency's relations with the exile groups, the payment to dependents of the strike forces and the publications which the Agency has been supporting. He emphasized that these involved a considerable amount of money and that the matter should be resolved at an early date. It was agreed that the Agency should discuss this matter with Deputy Assistant Secretary Morales-Carrion and submit a formal proposal to an early meeting of the Special Group.

**10. Minutes of Special Group Meetings**

Mr. Bundy requested that copies of the minutes of Special Group meetings be forwarded to members of the Group for approval and

**SECRET - EYES ONLY**

retention. Mr. Gilpatrick noted the very close relationship between his office and the Agency and felt that he could obtain all the information he needed without receiving a copy of the minutes. Mr. Dallas suggested that because of the sensitivity of these records and because some of the references contained therein involved the use of pseudonyms, the need of the Group might be satisfied by having copies of the minutes of each meeting made available at the subsequent meeting for approval. Messrs. Bundy and Dungan agreed to the submission of the minutes for approval at a subsequent meeting but stated that they might have a need for a complete record immediately at hand to answer any questions put to them by higher authority.

**THOMAS P. SCHREYER**

4

**SECRET - EYES ONLY**